Ikke-sammensatt 5 daglig i 80 dager. Flere investeringer er tillatt. 5 henvisningsprogram. Min. investering 1 USD. Maks. investering 49,99 USD. 100 Sikker på innskudd (er) angrep av hackere og etc. Ikke-sammensatt 1 6 daglig i 80 dager. Flere investeringer er tillatt. 5 henvisningsprogram. Min. investering 50 USD. Maks. investering 99,99 USD. 100 Sikker på innskudd (er) angrep av hackere og etc. Ikke-sammensatt 2 7 daglig i 80 dager. Flere investeringer er tillatt. 5 henvisningsprogram. Min. investering 100 USD. Maks. investering 1000 USD. 100 Sikker på innskudd (er) angrep av hackere og etc. Sammensatt 240 etter 12 dager. Flere investeringer er tillatt. Ingen henvisningsprogram. Min. investering 50 USD. Maks. investering 99,99 USD. 100 Sikker på innskudd (er) angrep av hackere og etc. Sammensatt 1 570 etter 25 dager. Flere investeringer er tillatt. Ingen henvisningsprogram. Min. investering 100 USD. Maks. investering 1000 USD. 100 Sikker på innskudd (er) angrep av hackere og etc. Vi er en gruppe erfarne handelsmenn og markedsanalytikere. Etter mange års faglig handel har vi sluttet seg til våre ferdigheter, kunnskaper og talenter i arbeidet med å skape en ny, pålitelig investeringsmulighet. Som et resultat av forsiktig planlegging og felles arbeid, har Forex Investment Fund (FIF), et pålitelig langsiktig investeringsprosjekt, gitt god avkastning sammen med profesjonell tilnærming og sikkerhet. Vi hevder ikke de høyeste rentene som er tilgjengelige online, og dette har aldri vært vårt primære mål. Det vi anser mest viktige er stabilitet, rettidig betaling og feilfri service. Men uten tvil Forex Investment Fund (FIF) skiller seg ut fra de fleste online investeringsmuligheter. Vår faglige kompetanse gjør at vi kan tilby deg sikker avkastning på investeringer. Vi planlegger vår investeringsportefølje for å redusere risikoen knyttet til handel. Vi bruker ulike investeringsstrategier og diversifiserer alltid våre investeringer. Diversifisering i handel er den viktigste delen som minimerer risikoen og genererer større overskudd. Forex Investment Fund (FIF) er en nøkkel til velstand og finansiell stabilitet. Forex Investment Fund (FIF) er et lån med høy ytelse, privat lån, støttet av Obligasjoner, Forex, Gull, Aksjehandel, og investerer i ulike fond og aktiviteter over hele verden. Forex Investment Fund (FIF) er et lån med høy ytelse, privat lån, støttet av Obligasjoner, Forex, Gull, Aksjehandel, og investerer i ulike fond og aktiviteter over hele verden. Vårt oppdrag er å gi våre investorer en flott mulighet for sine midler ved å investere så forsiktig som mulig på ulike arenaer for å få høye priser i retur. Vi er en vellykket gruppe privatpersoner som har gjort pengene våre gjennom forsiktige investeringer i finansbransjen verden over i over 8 år. Ærlig, vennligst ikke sammenligne oss med noe som HYIP-programmer eller spill som alltid kommer og går. Dessuten har vi en pålitelig og lønnsom kilde til reell nettoinntekt, basert på den virkelige investeringen fra det virkelige markedet. Det betyr at vi kan betale våre investorer i så mange år som de velger å forbli hos oss, om noen nye investorer noensinne er med eller ikke. Teamet vårt har vært stolt eid og operert siden juni 1998 og deltok i mange online og offline ventures, noe som resulterte i store fortjenestemarginaler for investorteamene og de eneste investorene. Vi er en gruppe privatpersoner som har vært i investeringsarenaen i over 8 år, de fleste av våre investorkamre er profesjonelle bankfolk, noen av dem har mange års virksomhet og økonomisk relatert erfaring. Vi er de seriøse menneskene som driver den seriøse virksomheten. Vår gruppe består av amerikanske, asiatiske, australske, kanadiske, europeiske mennesker, og dermed kan vi se alle de forskjellige markedene nesten 24 timer i døgnet. Uansett hvor gode handelsrekorder vi har blitt gjort, hjelper vi bare oss selv. Vi har sett mange mennesker lider av å miste fra ulike internett muligheter som ikke kan oppfylle sine løfter, slik at vi føler at det er behov for folk som om du skal få en jevn gevinst i inntekt uten å risikere store mengder penger. Det er grunnen til at Forex Investment Fund (FIF) ble født. U.S. Department of State Åpenhet til utenlandske investeringer Kenya har hatt en lang historie med økonomisk lederskap i Øst-Afrika som den største og mest avanserte økonomien i regionen. Men etnisk belastet vold etter vold i januar-februar 2008, som forlot 1.200 døde og 500.000 fordrevne, satte en abrupt stopp for robust vekst og hevede sikkerhetshensyn om Kenyalsquos investeringsklima. Turismeindustrien ble spesielt hardt rammet av volden, med 33 prosent i ankomster og 19 prosent i inntekter, mens landbruket led 300 millioner tap i eiendeler på grunn av manglende ødeleggelse av gårder og meierier. Både turisme og landbruk har spratt, med turisme vokser på sitt høyeste nivå og forventninger på mer enn 1,8 millioner ankomster i 2010. Den fredelige og historiske august 2010-folkeavstemningen, som godkjente en ny forfatning med to tredjedelers flertall, puster håp til Kenya39s framtidige mål. Etter å ha opplevd 7,1 prosent vekst i 2007 økte økonomien til 1,6 prosent vekst i 2008. Økonomien i 2009 vokste til 2,6 prosent, mens 2010 veksten i 3. kvartal oversteg seks prosent og veksten i 2010 skal overstige 5 prosent. Utsikter for 2011 og 2012 er at BNP-veksten skal nå 5 prosent av 6 prosent. Den gjennomsnittlige årlige inflasjonsraten var 16,2 prosent i 2008, som gikk ned til 9,2 prosent i 2009 og ytterligere til 4,5 prosent i desember 2010 for årets inflasjon. (Kenya endret metodologien til beregning av inflasjonsraten til et geometrisk system i 2009, noe som har resultert i mye lavere inflasjonsrate.) Så snart som i desember 2010 krevde 1,2 millioner kenyere nødhjelp, en dramatisk forbedring fra det verste av tørken i høsten 2009. De rikelige lange og korte regntider i 20092010 oppmuntret sterkt jordbruksgjenoppretting, selv om nordøstlige Kenya lider tidlig i 2011 fra under normale regner. Dessverre vil en hvilken som helst gjenoppretting av tørke utfalle en annen fødevaresikkerhetskrise i Kenya, ettersom vanningssystemer nesten ikke eksisterer. Følgelig, mens Kenya var et ypperlig valg for utenlandske investorer som ønsket å etablere seg i Øst-Afrika på 1960- og 1970-tallet, har en kombinasjon av politisk drevet økonomisk politikk, regjeringens misforståelse, voldsomme korrupsjon, ubestemte offentlige tjenester og dårlig infrastruktur motvirket utenlandske direkte investering (FDI) siden 1980-tallet. I løpet av de siste 25 årene har Kenya vært en underperformator i å tiltrekke seg FDI. Siden 2003 har Kenya39s ytelse i å tiltrekke FDI vært marginalt bedre ved nesten US 6 per US 1,000 av BNP (totalt 82 millioner amerikanske). Dette pales imidlertid i forhold til FDI nivåene i nabolandene med mindre økonomier. UNCTAD39s 2008 World Investment Report beskriver Kenya som Øst-Afrika regionens minst effektive suitor i å tiltrekke FDI. Beholdningen av FDI i Kenya stod på 183 millioner i 2008. Etter å ha hatt et bannerår i 2007, som tiltok 729 millioner i FDI, mottok Kenya kun 96 millioner i 2008 og 141 millioner i 2009. Nylige pressartikler tyder på at innenlandsk investering nå overstiger FDI og har en betydelig innvirkning på utviklingen i Kenya. Kenya39s suverene rating, som ble nedgradert etter volden etter valget tidlig i 2008, ble oppgradert i slutten av 2010 av SampP til positiv B fra stabile B. Tilsvarende forbedret Fitch Rating utsiktene fra negativt til stabilt, samtidig som de tidligere B-klassifiseringene ble beholdt. for langsiktig utenlandsk gjeld og BB - for langsiktig innenlandsk gjeld i januar 2009, er disse vurderingene fortsatt de samme som i januar 2011. En undersøkelse fra april 2008, utført av Kenya Manufacturers Association (KAM ndash Kenya39s fremste bransjeforening) at Kenya39s forretningsklima er fiendtlig. På grunn av det kostbare investeringsklimaet lærte KAM at et økende antall selskaper har valgt å skifte fra produksjon til handel. Andre har forlatt landet. Etter å ha undersøkt forklaringer på hvorfor bedrifter enten stanset eller flyttet det siste tiåret, antok KAM at legitim handel i Kenya er hemmet av: a) urettferdig utenlandsk konkurranse som dumper forfalskede og piratkopierte produkter (kosmetikk, toalettartikler, batterier, dekk, bil deler, medisiner, bøker, elektroniske medier og programvare) og brukte klær og sko på markedet, slipper av nye skotøy og andre klær som eksport og underfakturaeksport. b) høye kostnader ved produksjon på grunn av ublu elpriser, dårlig infrastruktur (særlig veier og skinner) og heftige transportkostnader (c) utilgjengelighet av råvarer som råolje (d) arbeidslover som tvinger private selskaper, i stedet for regjeringen, til å gi sine ansatte et sosialt sikkerhetsnett av fordeler, inkludert faderskap og fødselspermisjon og helsevesen ndash alle unntatt skattefrie (e) lav produktivitet, mangel på arbeidsdisiplin og sterke fagforeninger fokusert på høyere lønninger og fordeler (f) l ocal regjeringslisenser og trakassering over smålige krav (som kan tolkes som krav til bestikkelser) og (g) sviktet i Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) for å behandle bedriftsskatt og mva refusjon raskt. En analyse av Kenya39s skattesystem utført av Verdensbanken, International Finance Corporation og revisjonsfirma PriceWaterhouseCoopers og utgitt i begynnelsen av desember 2008 dømte Kenyalsquos skattesystem som den minst vennlige i Øst-Afrika. Rapporten, Skatteskatt 2009, kritiserer Kenya for å ikke ha en enkelt myndighet som er ansvarlig for alle skatteinnsamlinger. Snarere er Kenyalsquos skattestruktur preget av flere myndigheter, hver med myndighet til å samle inn skatt på ulike tidspunkter av året. Ifølge studien har Kenya fem forskjellige skattebetalingsdatoer hver måned for mva, bedriftsresultat, tilbakeholdenhet, trygd og helse. Bortsett fra kompleksiteten i deres skattesystem, klager mange kenyere om skatt er for høye. Følgelig er skatteunddragelse økende. Kenya er nå vitne til økende antall uregistrerte eller uformelle virksomheter som er kjent i lokal oversikt som ldquojua kali. rdquo (Merk: Ifølge Governmentlsquos 2010 Economic Survey, involverer den uformelle sektoren ca 80 prosent av arbeidsstyrken.) På grunn av countrylsquos flere skattebetalingsarkitektur og oppfattet høye skatter, rapporterte rapporten Kenya 158 av 181 land som ble undersøkt. Rapporten lovet Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) for sin effektive skatteinnsamling, og ønsket velkommen Governmentlsquos fremtidige lansering av et integrert skattesystem. Kenyanske bedrifter har den tyngste skattebyrden i Øst-Afrika. Til tross for at østafrikanske fellesskaps stater pålegger en uniform 30 prosent bedriftsskatt over hele regionen, må de kenyanske firmaene kjempe mot andre avgifter, hvis endelige innvirkning øker den samlede skattebyrden. Skatteeksperter på PriceWaterhouseCoopers sier at den totale bedriftsbelastningen i Kenya står for tiden på 49,7 prosent sammenlignet med Tanzania39s 45 prosent, Uganda39s 32 prosent og Rwanda39s 31 prosent. Denne tilleggsbelastningen har økt kostnadene ved å drive virksomhet i regionens største økonomi og redusert selskapets konkurranseevne. Kenyanske firmaer må kjempe med 41 forskjellige skattebetalinger som skjærer over 16 skattesystemer, som tar 417 man-timer til fil i forhold til verdens gjennomsnitt på 31 skattebetalinger og 286 timer, og dermed plasserer Kenya som et av landene med de mest kompliserte skattesystem i denne delen av verden. Grener av utenlandske selskaper betaler skatt til en sats på 37,5 prosent. Regjeringen definerer generelt skattepliktig inntekt for å være inntektsført i eller fra Kenya. Merværdiafgift (MVA) påføres varer importert til eller produsert i Kenya, og skattepliktige tjenester. Standardmomsatsen er 16 prosent. Diskusjon fra regjeringen om merverdiavgiften i begynnelsen av 2011 fokusert på å redusere eller eliminere unntak for å skape en bredere inntektsgrunnlag i motsetning til økningsrenter. Kriminalitet er en annen disincentive. I en egen 2007 KAM-undersøkelse rapporterte 33 prosent av de kenyanske firmaene kriminalitet som et alvorlig problem, og utgjorde et tap på nesten 4 prosent på årlig omsetning. KAM oppdaget at virksomheter i gjennomsnitt tildeler 3 prosent av driftsbudsjettene til private sikkerhetstjenester og sikkerhetsoppgraderinger. Senior tjenestemenn er godt klar over disse problemene. I tillegg innvilget viceminister og handelsminister Uhuru Kenyatta i begynnelsen av desember offentlig at en umiddelbar handling som involverer en samordnet innsats blant medlemmer av det østafrikanske fellesskapet (EAC) må gjøres for å forby forfalskede varer å komme inn i Kenya og regionen. Han anerkjente at forfalskninger undergraver den innenlandske industrisektoren. Andre hindringer for investeringer som krever rask oppmerksomhet, sier han, inkluderer usikkerhet, en uvanlig forretningsregulering og høye energikostnader. Den 5. august 2008 begynte statsminister Raila Odinga å holde kvartalsmøter som ledd i en offentlig-privat dialog kalt quotational Business Agendaquot med formannene til KAM, Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), Østafrikas handelsråd (EABC) , og andre bedriftsledere for å diskutere hva som må gjøres for å forbedre landets forretningsklima. Som et resultat av det første møtet, bestilte Odinga og president Mwai Kibaki at Mombasa havn ble åpnet 247, antall veier og veier på Mombasa-Nairobi-Busia Northern Corridor Highway ble dramatisk redusert, og at Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS), og KRA harmonisere deres forskrifter og vedta en felles akkreditering og datastyrt clearance system for å fremskynde last inspeksjon og clearance. Regjeringen behandlet problemene med havn og veibeskyttelse, mens harmoniseringsproblemene fortsatt skal behandles. Deretter bestilte president Mwai Kibaki og deretter finansminister John Michuki at mva reduseres eller elimineres på energiinnganger. Statskassen kunngjorde i slutten av november 2008 at den ville suspendere en 120 prosent avgift på produksjon av plast. For å lette inflasjonstrykket på matkurven reduserte regjeringen i midten av juni 2008 oppgaven på importert hvete fra 35 prosent til 10 prosent og noll-vurdert 297 000 tonn importert mais. Den fraviste også 60 prosent plikten på 52.149 tonn importert hvetemel. Landbruksministeren nulstilles også mva. På brød, hvetemel, melk, ris og maismete. I tråd med sin privatiseringsstrategi kunngjorde regjeringen i midten av desember 2008 at den ville selge sine aksjer i 16 parastataler, inkludert Kenya Bank of Kenya, Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen), Kenya Pipeline Company, Kenya Ports Authority , og ulike sukker-, sement-, meieri-, vin - og kjøttprosessfirmaer. Regjeringen har også satt Kenya Tourism Development Authority opp til salgs i 2009. Til dags dato har regjeringen ikke fullført noe av salget. I desember 2008 godkjente regjeringen også det foreslåtte rettslige og institusjonelle rammebetinget for offentlig-private partnerskap, og derved godkjente at private firmaer nå signerer ledelseskontrakter, leiekontrakter, innrømmelser og - boot-avtaler med BOOT-avtaler med Regjeringen på ulike infrastrukturprosjekter som vann, energi, havner og veier. I en annen positiv utvikling er kreditt nå lettere tilgjengelig fra kenyanske utlånsinstitusjoner, ifølge en analyse utgitt tidlig i desember 2008, ldquoFirst Things Faster: Kenya Competitiveness Benchmark Report 2008.rdquo Rapporten citerte også Kenya39s engasjement for innovasjon som bidrar til forretningsutvikling . Økt utlån, som førte til å registrere antall bilsalg i 2010, gjenspeiler sterk forbrukertillid i vekstøkonomien. Selskapsforordningen, partnerskapsloven, loven om utenlandsk investeringsbeskyttelse og investeringsfremmende loven 2004 gir det juridiske rammebetinget for utdanningsinstitusjoner. For å tiltrekke seg investeringer, vedtok Kenya-regjeringen flere reformer, blant annet å avskaffe eksport - og importlicensiering, bortsett fra noen få ting som er oppført i loven om import, eksport og vesentlige forsyninger, rationalisering og reduksjon av importtariffer, tilbakekalling av alle eksportoppgaver og gjeldende konto restriksjoner, frigjøre Kenya Shilling39s valutakurs, slik at innbyggere og ikke-hjemmehørende kan åpne utenlandske valuta kontoer hos innenlandske banker, og fjerne restriksjoner på lån av utenlandske og innenlandske selskaper. I 2007 gjennomgikk de koreanske investeringspolitikken sin og lanserte en utviklingsstrategi for privat sektor. En politisk gjennomgang av FNs konferanse om handel og utvikling (UNCTAD) er en del av denne innsatsen. Lisensloven fra 2007 har hittil eliminert eller forenklet 694 lisenser. I 2008 reduserte regjeringen også antall lisenser for å sette opp en bedrift fra 300 til 16, og vil gjennomgå ytterligere 337 lisenser. Forretningsforvaltningsloven fra 2007 etablerte en forretningsregulerende reformenhet i Finansdepartementet for å fortsette avreguleringsprosessen. I 2009 lanserte Kenya et nasjonalt e-register for å lette forretningslisensbehandling og bidra til å forbedre gjennomsiktigheten. I 2008 vedtok parlamentet forfalskningsloven, som president Kibaki undertegnet i loven, etablert et byrå og et sterkt lovverk for politiet forfalskede varer. I juni 2010 opererte Næringsdepartementet (dets overordnede organ) Anti-Forfalsket Agency. Den nascent byrået er fortsatt byggekapasitet og sliter med mangel på ressurser, mens utskjæring sin rolle. For å bekjempe import av forfalskninger, dekrette industripolitikken og Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) i 2009 at alle lokalt produserte varer må ha et standardiseringsmerke utstedt av KEBS, mens flere kategorier importerte varer (spesielt matvarer, elektronikk, og medisiner) må ha et import standardiseringsmerke (ISM), som koster 300 per produkt. De respektive roller i offentlig og privat sektor har utviklet seg siden uavhengighet i 1963, med et skift i vekt fra offentlige investeringer til privat sektor-ledet investering. GOK har innført markedsbaserte reformer og gitt flere incentiver til både lokale og utenlandske private investeringer. Utenlandske investorer som ønsker å etablere seg i Kenya, mottar generelt samme behandling som lokale investorer. Multinasjonale selskaper utgjør en stor prosentandel av Kenya39s industrisektor. Kenya39s investeringskode, som er formulert i investeringsprotokolloven fra 2004, strømlinjeformet de administrative og rettslige prosedyrene for å skape et mer attraktivt investeringsklima. Den trådte i kraft da den ble publisert i 2005. Investeringsfremmingsloven er å tiltrekke og legge til rette for investeringer ved å bistå investorer med å skaffe lisensene som er nødvendige for å investere, og ved å yte annen assistanse og insentiver. Loven erstattet Governments Investment Promotion Center med Kenya Investment Authority (KIA), men loven skapte også noen nye barrierer. Det fastsatte minimumsgrensen for utenlandske investeringer på 500.000 og betinget noen fordeler ved å skaffe et investeringsbevis fra KIA. Regjeringen reviderte senere den minste utenlandske investeringstærskelen til 100 000 som en endring av loven. Minimum investeringskrav vil sannsynligvis avskrekke utenlandske investeringer, spesielt innen servicesektoren, som normalt ikke er så kapitalintensiv som landbruks - og industrisektoren. En annen endring gjorde kravet om utenlandsk investeringsbevis valgfritt. Arbeidstillatelse kreves for alle utenlandske statsborgere som ønsker å jobbe i landet. Den kenyanske regjeringen forventer at utenlandske ansatte er nøkkelansvarlige eller har spesielle ferdigheter som ikke er tilgjengelige lokalt. Utenlandske investorer er pålagt å inngå en avtale med regjeringen som definerer opplæringsarrangementer for å fange utlendinger. Enhver bedrift, enten lokal eller utenlandsk, kan rekruttere utlendinger for en kategori av dyktig arbeidskraft, hvis Kenyans ikke er tilgjengelige. Arbeidsdepartementet utvikler en ferdighetsbeholdning. Dette bør erstatte arbeidsmarkedsprøveprosedyren, i hvert fall for høyverdige stillinger, med en forhåndsbestemt liste over ferdigheter med mangel i Kenya. Investorer som søker utenlandske ansatte med disse ferdighetene ville ikke være pålagt å demonstrere ved en uttømmende lokal rekrutteringskampanje at kvalifiserte borgere ikke var tilgjengelige. Godkjente arbeidsgivere ville ha rett til å ansette slike utenlandske arbeidstakere, kun underlagt verifikasjon av legitimasjonene og karakteren til de individer som foreslås for ansettelse av Innvandringsdepartementet. Det blir stadig vanskeligere for utlendinger å skaffe arbeidstillatelse fordi det er sagt at kvalifiserte mellomstore ledere og tekniske staber er tilgjengelige lokalt. Kenya39s høye arbeidsledighetsnivå driver sannsynligvis den nye trenden. Arbeidsledighetsnivået for 2010 er 10 prosent, men den reelle ledigheten i arbeidsledigheten i landet er over 40 prosent. GOK fokuserer sin investeringsfremmende på muligheter som tjener utenlandsk valuta, gir sysselsetting, fremmer koblinger bakover og fremover, og overfører teknologi. De eneste betydelige sektorene hvor investering (både utenlandsk og innenlandsk) er begrenset, er de statlige selskapene fortsatt har et lovfestet monopol på. Disse er begrenset nesten helt til infrastruktur (for eksempel kraft, innlegg, telekommunikasjon og porter), selv om det har vært delvis liberalisering av disse sektorene. For eksempel har fem uavhengige kraftprodusenter (IPP) de siste årene begynt operasjoner i Kenya. Fra januar 2011 er det fire mobilkommunikasjonsleverandører i Kenya: den delvis statseide Safaricom, fransk-eide Orange (den mobile delen av Telkom Kenya), den indianske eide Bharti Airtel (tidligere Zain) og indian-eid Yu (tidligere Essar Telecom). Utenlandske teleselskaper kan også etablere seg i Kenya, men må ha minst 20 prosent lokalt eierskap. Regjeringen ga imidlertid en treårsperiode for teleselskapene for å finne lokale investorer for å oppfylle de lokale eierskapskravene, og den koreanske myndigheten kan helt og fullt skrape den lokale eierskapspolitikken. En lovmelding som ble offentliggjort i juni 2007 reduserte terskelen for utenlandsk eierskap av børsnoterte selskaper på Nairobi-børsen (NSE) fra 75 prosent til 60 prosent, noe som er et avskrekk for utenlandske eide selskaper som er interessert i en NSE-notering. Selv om forskriften ikke gjelder med tilbakevirkende kraft, tvinger det selskaper med en utenlandsk tilstedeværelse på over 60 prosent til å nedgradere utenlandsk aksjepost før søknad til NSE. Tiltaket slår dermed effektivt disse selskapene fra å selge overskytende aksjer til ikke-kenyere. Det er ingen diskriminering mot utenlandske investorer i tilgang til statsfinansiert forskning. Regjeringens eksportfremmende programmer skiller ikke mellom lokale og utenlandsk eide varer. UNCTAD, i samarbeid med International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), publiserte en investeringsveiledning til Kenya i mai 2005. Guiden gir omfattende analyser av investeringstrender, muligheter og regelverket i landet. I henhold til UNCTAD-rapporten (og de fleste observatører) er betydelige avskrekkende investeringer i Kenya blant annet statlig overregulering og ineffektivitet, dyr og uregelmessig elektrisitet og vannforsyning, en underutviklet telekommunikasjonssektor, dårlig transportinfrastruktur og høye kostnader forbundet med kriminalitet og generell usikkerhet . Selv om det ikke foreligger noen spesifikk lovgivning som forhindrer utlendinger i å eie land, er det ifølge deres kontrollloven at deres evne til å eie eller leie land som er klassifisert som landbruk, er begrenset. Landkontrollloven tjener derfor som en barriere for enhver agro-prosessering investering som kan kreve land. Det eneste unntaket i denne loven er å skaffe seg et presidensavlydende, som ikke har klare retningslinjer og har ført til klager om overdreven byråkrati og patronage. Den nye grunnloven sier at ikke-borgere ikke kan eie land, men kan leie land i maksimal periode på 99 år. EAC, grunnlagt i 1999, består av Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda og Burundi, med Rwanda og Burundi som fullvoksen i Fellesskapet i 2007. EAC har til hensikt å utvide og utdype samarbeidet mellom partnerlandene i politiske, økonomiske, sosial og andre felt for gjensidig nytte. I henhold til protokollen skal EAC-medlemslandene tillate null-vurdert innførsel av råvarer, en avgift på 10 prosent avgift på halvfabrikata, og en avgift på 25 prosent på ferdigvarer. Realiseringen av en stor økonomisk blokk med en samlet befolkning på over 125 millioner og et samlet bruttonasjonalprodukt på 61 milliarder kroner har stor strategisk og geopolitisk betydning og gir utsiktene til en fornyet og nyoppusset EAC. EAC-tullunionen trådte i kraft 1. januar 2010, mens EAC-fellesmarkedet trådte i kraft 1. juli 2010. Mens medlemslandene har blitt enige om tollunionen og fellesmarkedet, vil den faktiske gjennomføringen ta betydelig tid . EAC-medlemslandene, inkludert Kenya, har ikke bestått mange av lovene knyttet til det felles markedet, og håndhevelse av tollunionen ved grenseoverganger er langt fra sammenhengende eller ensartet. Blant de problemene som skal løses, er sentralisert inntektsinntekt ved første inngangspunkt i EAC og styring av transittfrakt i en grenseløs region. Løpende planlegging for ØK inkluderer en monetær union innen 2013 og eventuell politisk føderasjon. Ikke-tariff barrierer (NTB) er imidlertid et problem i EAC. En rapport fra mars 2005 om NTBs og utviklingen av et Business Climate Index i Øst-Afrikas Regionkvot av Østafrikas handelsråd identifiserte administrasjon av plikter og andre avgifter som hoved NTB, etterfulgt av korrupsjon. Rapporten indikerer at Kenyalsquos investeringsnivå og forretningsoptimisme er dempet av lave forventninger knyttet til forbedringer i infrastruktur, tilgang til land og lønnsomhet i virksomheten. Siden uavhengighet har Kenya forfulgt to brede strategier for industrialisering, nemlig importsubstitusjon og eksportorientert industrialisering. Det er i ferd med å implementere en industrialiseringsstrategi som er skissert i Sessional Paper nr. 2 av 1996, som har til hensikt å omdanne Kenya til en helt industriell stat i 2020. Strategien legger vekt på støtte til spesifikke eksportindustrier, drevet av et ønske om å øke sitt sysselsettingspotensial. Visjon 2030, avduket i 2007 som GOKrsquos langsiktige plan for å oppnå mellominntektsstatus som en nasjon, støtter Sessional Paper ved å anerkjenne industriell forfremmelse som en avenue for vekst og utvikling. Kenya opplever vanskeligheter med å ta tak i muligheter som genereres av handelsliberalisering i utviklede markeder for å eksportere produserte varer. Hovedparten av sin eksport til EU er hagebruk basert med minimal verdi tillegg: te, kaffe, kutte blomster, grønnsaker, frukt og nøtter. I kontrast består produserte varer (hovedsakelig klær) mesteparten av eksporten til USA i henhold til den afrikanske vekst - og mulighetsloven (AGOA). Tekstil - og plaggindustrien er i stor grad avhengig av importerte stoffer og råvarer som bomull, viskose, polyester, denim, polyester, nylon og akryl, siden en konkurransedyktig integrert innenriks bomullsindustri ikke eksisterer. 2010 Heritage Foundation Indeks for økonomisk frihet plasserer Kenya 101 av 179 land, en dråpe på 11 steder fra 2009, og den ble rangert som 13 av 46 land i Afrika sør for Sahara. Konverterings - og overføringspolitikk Den utenlandske investeringsbeskyttelsesloven (FIPA) (Kap 518) garanterer kapitalutlanding, overføring av utbytte og interesse for utenlandske investorer. Utenlandske investorer kan konvertere og repatriere fortjeneste, inkludert ikke-kapitalisert beholdt fortjeneste, dvs. fortjeneste av investeringen etter betaling av de aktuelle skattene og hovedstol og renter knyttet til eventuelle lån. Valutakurs er lett tilgjengelig fra kommersielle banker og utenlandsk byråer og kan fritt kjøpes og selges av lokale og utenlandske investorer. Den kenyanske shilling har en flytende valutakurs knyttet til en kurv med utenlandsk valuta. Sjillingen var relativt stabil de siste årene fram til slutten av 2007, da den økte betydelig i verdi mot dollaren, til og med trading kort under KSh60 til dollaren. I etterkant av den 27. desember 2008 etter voldsdagen ble både økonomien og sjillingen alvorlig redusert. Fra januar 2011 handlet shillingen til nesten KSh80 til dollar. Kenya har ingen restriksjoner på å konvertere eller overføre midler knyttet til investering. Kenyansk lov krever en erklæring om beløp over 500 000 kroner (ca. 6.500) som en formell kontroll mot hvitvasking av penger. Parlamentet vedtok den kenyanske inntektsprisen for kriminalitet og hvitvasking av penger og president Kibaki undertegnet det til lov ved utgangen av 2009. Selv om lovgivningen trådte i kraft i juni 2010, har ikke implementeringsforskrifter blitt utarbeidet til nå, noe som ville bringe Kenya inn linje med mer avanserte økonomiske økonomier og bidra til å redusere alvorlige problemer med hvitvasking av penger. Kenya er en del av den østlige og sørlige Afrika-gruppen for hvitvasking av penger og samarbeider med den mellomstatslige finanspolitiske handlingsstyrken (FATF). Ekspropriasjon og kompensasjon Kenyansk investeringslov er modellert på engelsk investeringslov. Selskapsloven, Investeringsloven og Investeringsloven er de viktigste lovene som styrer investeringer i Kenya. Kenyansk lov gir beskyttelse mot ekspropriering av privat eiendom, bortsett fra hvor forfalt prosedyre følges og tilstrekkelig og rask kompensasjon er gitt. Ulike bilaterale avtaler garanterer også ytterligere beskyttelse med andre land. Ekspropriasjon kan bare skje av sikkerhetshensyn eller offentlig interesse. Den koreanske myndigheten kan tilbakekalle en utenlandsk investeringslisens dersom (1) det er gjort en feilaktig erklæring når det søkes om lisensen, bestemmelsene i investeringsfremmende loven eller annen lov som gir lisensen er overtrådt eller, hvis (2) det foreligger brudd på vilkårene for den generelle myndighet. Investeringsfremmingsloven fra 2004 fastsetter tilbakekalling av lisensen i tilfelle av bedragerisk representasjon til Kenya Investment Authority (KIA) ved å gi en skriftlig melding til investor for å vise årsak innen 30 dager fra oppsigelsestidspunktet hvorfor lisensen ikke skal være opphevet. I praksis opphever KIA sjelden kun lisenser. Som et eksempel på ekspropriasjon og kompensasjon, i september 2007 invadert squatters en privatby på 15 000 hektar i Coast Province, knapt en måned etter at president Kibaki annonserte at tomgang ville bli gjenbesatt og gitt til de jordløse. Regjeringen til slutt betalte privateieren mer enn 10 millioner for landet. Kenya er medlem av Verdensbankens tilknyttede multilaterale investeringsgarantibyrå (MIGA), som utsteder garantier mot ikke-kommersiell risiko for foretak som investerer i medlemsland. Det er også undertegnende av konvensjonen om oppgjør av investeringstvister mellom stater og statsborgere i andre stater. Konvensjonen opprettet International Center for Settling of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under Verdensbankens regi. Kenya er også medlem av Afrika Trade Insurance Agency (ATIA). Kenya er medlem av mange andre globale og regionale organisasjoner og avtaler, inkludert det felles markedet for østlige og sørlige Afrika (COMESA), Cotonou-avtalen mellom Den europeiske union og de afrikanske, karibiske og stillehavs stater (AVS) Paris-konvensjonen om immateriell rettighet, den universelle opphavsrettskonvensjonen og Bern-Copyright-konvensjonen World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) og Verdenshandelsorganisasjonen (WTO). Kenya har også inngått dobbeltbeskatningstraktater med en rekke land, inkludert Canada, Kina, Tyskland, Frankrike, Japan, Nederland og India. Den 27. november 2007 kom Kenya sammen med sine EAC-søsterstatene i å signere den første økonomiske avtalen med Det europeiske fellesskap (EC). I midten av juli 2008 undertegnet Kenya og dets andre EAC-medlemmer en Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) med USA ved slutten av forumet for Afrika Vekst og Opportunity for 2008 i Washington, DC. Den kenyanske forfatningen garanterer beskyttelse av liv og eiendom, som straffeloven til lovene i Kenya også beskytter. Deres krenkelse kan gjennomføres i straffelov. Til tross for disse beskyttelsene har usikkerhet i form av internasjonal terrorisme, usikre grenser og felles kriminalitet vært en stor bekymring for mange investorer i Kenya. Kenyalsquos rettssystem er modellert etter britene, med magistrateslsquo domstoler, høy domstol i store byer og en Court of Appeal på topp av rettssystemet. Umiddelbart under høy domstolene er underordnede domstoler bestående av Kadisdomstolene, Resident Magistratelsquos Courts, District Magistratelsquos Courts og Court Martial (for medlemmer av Forsvaret). I tillegg hører en egen industriell domstol tvister over lønns - og arbeidsvilkår. Framtaksmannene kan ikke klage på sine vedtak, med unntak av prosessmessige grunner. Kenya har også kommersielle domstoler for å håndtere kommersielle tvister. Selskapsloven fra 1948 gir grunnlaget for selskaps - og investeringsretten. Eiendoms - og kontraktsrettigheter kan håndheves, men lange forsinkelser i å løse kommersielle saker er vanlige. Retssystemet i Kenya er motstridende, og de fleste tvister er løst gjennom rettssaker i retten, selv om voldgift og alternativ tvisteløsning blir stadig mer populær. Voldgiftsloven regulerer voldgift. Den nye grunnloven, når den er fullstendig vedtatt, vil forandre domstolssystemet dramatisk. Kenya vil ha en Høyesterett, en Court of Appeal, en konstitusjonell domstol og en høyesterett. I tillegg vil underordnede domstoler, Magistrates, Khadis, og Courts Martial, forbli. Stortinget vil avgjøre om industrielle og kommersielle domstoler vil forbli. Utenriksdommer (gjensidig håndhevelse) lov gir håndhevelse i Kenya om dommer gitt i andre land som gir gjensidig behandling av dommer gitt i Kenya. De landene som Kenya har inngått gjensidige håndhevelsesavtaler med, er Australia, Storbritannia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia og Seychellene. Uten en slik avtale er en utenlandsk dom ikke tvangsfull i de kenyanske domstolene, bortsett fra at det er pålagt dommedag. Kenyanske domstoler anerkjenner generelt en styrelovsklausul i en avtale som fastsetter utenlandsk lov. A Kenyan court would not give effect to a foreign law if the parties intended to apply it in order to evade the mandatory provisions of a Kenyan law with which the agreement has its most substantial connection, and which the court would normally have applied. Foreign advocates are not entitled to practice in Kenya unless a Kenyan advocate instructs and accompanies them, although a foreign advocate may practice as an advocate for the purposes of a specified suit or matter if appointed to do so by the Attorney General. All advocates in private practice are members of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), while those in public service need not be. Kenya does not have a bankruptcy law. Creditors39 rights are comparable to those in other common law countries. Monetary judgments typically are made in Kenyan shillings. The government does accept binding international arbitration of investment disputes with foreign investors. Apart from being a member of the ICSID, Kenya is a party to the New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). Performance Requirements and Incentives The law permits investors in the manufacturing and hotel sectors to deduct from their taxes a large portion of the cost of buildings and capital machinery. The government allows all locally financed materials and equipment (excluding motor vehicles and goods for regular repair and maintenance) for use in construction or refurbishment of tourist hotels to be zero-rated for purposes of Value Added Tax (VAT). The Ministry of Finance permanent secretary must approve such purchases. The government permits some VAT remission on capital goods, including plants, machinery, and equipment for new investment, expansion of investment, and replacement. The investment allowance under the Income Tax Act is set at 100 percent. Materials imported for use in manufacturing for export or for production of duty-free items for domestic sale qualify for the investment allowance. Approved suppliers, who manufacture goods for the exporter, are also entitled to the same import duty relief. The program is also open to Kenyan companies producing goods that can be imported duty-free or goods for supply to the armed forces or to an approved aid-funded project. Fiscal incentives offered by the Kenyan government to Export Processing Zone (EPZ) investments and registered and approved venture-capital-fund investments include a 10 year tax holiday and a flat 25 percent tax for the next 10 years exemption from withholding taxes during the first 10 years exemption from import duties on machinery, raw materials, and inputs no restrictions on management or technical arrangements and exemption from stamp duty and from the VAT on raw materials, machinery and other inputs. The Export Promotion Programs Office, set up in 1992 under the Ministry of Finance, administers the duty remission facility. The government established a Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB) program in 1986 that is open to both local and foreign investors. The law exempts enterprises operating under the program from duty and VAT on imported plants, machinery, equipment, raw materials, and other imported inputs. The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) administers the program. Foreign investors are attracted to the EPZs by their single licensing regime, tax incentives, and support services provided such as power and water. The number of enterprises operating in Kenya39s EPZs increased from 66 in 2003 to 74 in 2004. They declined to 68 in 2005 following the end of the Multi-fiber Textile Agreement in January 2005 before increasing to 71 in 2006. In 2007, 72 firms were in operation, which increased to 74 in 2008. In 2009, 83 firms were operating in the EPZs, although the number of Kenyans employed actually declined slightly. The majority of Kenya39s manufactured products are entitled to preferential duty treatment in Canada and the European Union. Kenya39s statute does not permit manufacturing companies, whether domestic or foreign-owned, to distribute their own products. The preferential access and duty free status accorded to Kenyan apparel exports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) fueled the initial increase in the number of apparel factories. Kenya39s major exports under AGOA include apparel and handicrafts. Over 50 percent of EPZ manufactured products enter the U. S. market under AGOA provisions. In 2005, 25 apparel firms in the EPZ39s were manufacturing apparel for export under AGOA. That number declined to 22 in 2007 and to 18 in 2008 following the January-February 2008 post-election violence. 2009 saw an increase to 19 firms operating under AGOA, although the number of Kenyans employed by these firms continued to drop. With the exception of the insurance and telecommunications sectors and other infrastructure companies discussed earlier, Kenya does not require that its nationals own a percentage of a company. The government does not require that the percentage of foreign ownership be reduced over time. There are no restrictions on the percentage of equity that foreign nationals may hold in a locally incorporated company, although foreign firms are encouraged to form joint ventures with Kenyan companies or entrepreneurs. However, there are some restrictions on investment in companies listed on the NSE and certain businesses. Foreign brokerage companies and fund management firms must be locally registered companies, with Kenyan ownership of at least 30 percent and 51 percent, respectively. Foreign ownership of equity in insurance and telecommunications companies is restricted to 66.7 percent and 80 percent, respectively. However, the government allows telecommunications companies a three-year grace period to find local investors to achieve the local ownership requirements and the local ownership policy may be scrapped entirely. A legal notice published in June 2007 decreed that companies seeking a listing on the NSE could not have foreign ownership above the 60 percent threshold. Previously the NSE threshold for foreign ownership for some companies was 75 percent. Foreign equity in companies engaged in fishing activities is restricted to 49 percent of the voting shares under the Fisheries Act. Foreign investors are free to obtain financing locally or offshore. The manufacture of and dealing in firearms (including ammunition) and explosives require special licenses from Chief Firearms Licensing Officer and the Commissioner of Mines and Geology, under the Firearms Act and the Explosives Act respectively. The manufacture of and dealing in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is prohibited under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. Technology licenses are, however, subject to scrutiny by the Kenya Industrial Property Office (KIPO) to ensure that they are in line with the Industrial Property Act. Licenses are valid for five years and are renewable. The government does not steer investment to specific geographic locations but encourages investments in sectors that create employment, generate foreign exchange, and create forward and backward linkages with the rural areas. The law applies local content rules but only for purposes of determining whether goods qualify for preferential duty rates within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the EAC. Right to Private Ownership and Establishment The Kenyan legal system is quite flexible on exit options, which normally are determined by the agreement that the investor has with other investors. The Companies Act specifies how a foreign investor may exit from an incorporated company. In practice, a company faces no obstacles when divesting its assets in Kenya, if the legal requirements and licenses have been satisfied. The Companies Act gives the procedures for both voluntary and compulsory winding-up processes. In late 2006, the U. S. multinational personal grooming and hygiene company, Colgate Palmolive, closed its factory in Kenya. MobilExxon divested and sold its assets to the Libyan oil company, Tamoil, in 2007. In 2008, Chevron divested and sold its assets to Total. Reckitt Benckiser East Africa Limited, a multinational firm that makes household cleaning health and personal care products, also closed its Kenyan facility. Many U. S. companies remain in the market and, in 2010, some recorded record profits. The typical reason given for a firm closing its factories in Kenya is restructuring to cut costs and improve efficiency in its African markets. The high cost of production as a result of poor infrastructure, inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, and unreliable and expensive electrical power continues to frustrate Kenyarsquos manufacturing sector, even as economic growth forges ahead. Private enterprises can freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interest in business enterprises. In general, competitive equality is the standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises. However, certain parastatals have enjoyed preferential access to markets. Examples include Kenya Reinsurance (Kenya-Re) with a guaranteed market share, Kenya Seed Company, with fewer marketing barriers than its foreign competitors, and the Kenya National Oil Corporation (KNOC), with retail market outlets developed with government funds. Some state corporations have also benefited from easier access to government credit at favorable interest rates. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. In theory, the legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights ndash land, buildings, and mortgages. In practice, obtaining a title to land is a cumbersome and often non-transparent process, which is a serious impediment to new investment, frequently complicated by improper allocation of access and easements to third parties. There is also a general unwillingness of the courts to permit mortgage lenders to sell land to collect debts. Only Kenyan citizens or incorporated companies, whose majority shareholders are Kenyan citizens, may own land. Since January 2003, the government has been nullifying some illegally acquired land allocations. The question of title to land acquired irregularly under the Moi government is the subject of continued controversy. The issue is particularly important because land secures 80 percent of bank loans. Kenya has a comprehensive legal framework to ensure intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, which includes the Anti-Counterfeiting Act of 2009, the Industrial Property Act of 2001, the Trade Marks Act, the Copyright Act of 2001, the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act, and the Universal Copyright Convention. The new Anti-Counterfeiting Act creates a new agency, the Anti-Counterfeiting Agency (ACA), to enforce IPR laws in Kenya. The ACA will be the lead agency for IPR enforcement and will coordinate its activities with the other enforcement bodies, including the Kenya Copyright Board (responsible for copyrights), the Kenya Industrial Property Institutes (responsible for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets), the Pharmacy and Poisons Board (responsible for medicines), and several other agencies. Penalties under the Anti-Counterfeiting Act are substantially more punitive than under previous IPR laws. The Ministry of Finance badly underfunded the new organization in its first year, resulting in a reduced workforce and slower buildup of capacity. The Copyright Act protects literary, musical, artistic, audio-visual works, sound recordings and broadcasts, and computer programs. Criminal penalties associated with piracy in Kenya include a fine of up to KSh800,000 (about 10,000), a jail term of up to 10 years, and confiscation of pirated material but enforcement and the understanding of the importance of intellectual property are poor. Copyright protection is the responsibility of the parastatal, the Kenya Copyright Board (KCB), which resides under the Attorney General39s Office. In collaboration with Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, the KCB has in the past several years carried out a number of major busts. In November 2007, cyber cafeacute operators within Nairobi grappled between legalizing their Microsoft software operating system, shifting to Open Source Code, or closing shop all together following a joint KCB-police crackdown on illegal software. Most cyber cafes in Kenya use Microsoft software, although without valid licenses. The KCB raided the Jet Cyber and Dagit Cyber Cafe companies in Nairobi on the suspicion of copyright infringement. The raids on the cyber cafes came after the expiry of an October 30, 2007 deadline set by the KCB. During the raid, 50 computers containing unlicensed versions of Microsoft Windows Office 2003 edition were confiscated. Also impounded were Windows 2000 and Microsoft 2003 counterfeit installer CDs. The computers were valued at KSh1.5 million (about 18,750), while the cost of Windows and Office were estimated at KSh1.4 million (about 17,500). On September 18, 2008, Nairobi police and agents with Kenya39s Bureau of Weights and Measures raided two warehouses suspected of holding counterfeit Hewlett-Packard products and arrested the warehouse owner. Local authorities working with Hewlett Packard (HP) have seized more the 9000 counterfeits in Kenya since November 2008. Kenya is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and of the Paris Union (International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property) along with the United States and 80 other countries. The African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO) embodies a future prospect for patent, trademark, and copyright protection, although its enforcement and cooperation procedures are yet untested. Kenya also is a member of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO). Kenya is a signatory to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks however, the other original EAC members (Uganda and Tanzania) are not. The Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI), under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, is responsible for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. Investors are entitled to national treatment and priority right recognition for their patent and trademark filing dates. The Trade Marks Act provides protection for registered trade and service marks that is valid for 10 years and is renewable. The Act established an independent national patent law and KIPI, which considers applications for and grants industrial property rights. However, actual protection for intellectual property -- copyrights, patents, and trademarks -- remains inadequate. The sale of pirated audio and videocassettes is rampant, although there is little domestic production. According to the Business Software Association (BSA), an estimated USD 3.5 million is lost every year because of the use of illegal software, mainly by businesses. Kenya enacted the Industrial Property Act (KIPA) of 2002 to comply with WTO obligations, but its implementation of the law remains weak. In July 2006, the Ministry of Trade and Industry conceded that over KSh 36 billion (about 450 million) is lost annually due to the sale of counterfeit goods and a further KSh 6 billion (about 75 million) is lost in tax revenues to the government. A subsequent KAM study, released in late October 2008, concluded that piracy and counterfeiting of business software, music, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods costs Kenyan firms about 715 million annually in lost sales. KAM estimates the government now loses over 270 million in potential taxes every year. Since then, former KEBS Director Dr. Kioko Man39geli charged that counterfeits are eating 10 percent of this countrylsquos GDP annually. To combat the manufacture and sale of counterfeits, he announced that, as part of a five-year strategic plan, KEBS would require that manufacturers obtain a new standardization mark. KEBS would also open a National Quality Institute to train both business leaders and consumers and would offer IPR courses to magistrates. On behalf of local textile and apparel producers, Kenyan Customs and Port Authority officers have prevented the transshipment of foreign-made (mostly Asian) garments through the Port of Mombasa that are fraudulently being exported to the United States under AGOA preferences. Kenya is also working to crack down on the entry into the local market of counterfeit or substandard goods. In 2006, it confiscated and destroyed over 3 million fake Bic pens. Since then, the Kenyan government has intercepted additional counterfeit Bic pens, Eveready batteries, Kiwi shoe polish, and other pirated consumer goods. Unfortunately, inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights continues to affect global companies operating in Kenya and within the region. Inadequate funding for Kenya39s anti-counterfeiting agencies limits the number of seizures and destruction of counterfeits in an environmentally friendly way ndash often leaving seized goods to pile up in warehouses where they may be stolen and returned to the market. Inadequate training for judges means that the new law is often not enforced or manipulated so that counterfeiters may retrieve their goods after paying a small fine. Transparency of Regulatory System Investors in Kenya are required to comply with environmental standards. The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) oversees these matters and is the principal environmental regulatory agency. Developers of particular projects are required to carry out Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) prior to project implementation. Companies are required to submit their up-to-date assessment reports to NEMA for verification by the agencylsquos environmental auditors before they can receive an EIA license. In theory, all investors receive equal treatment in the initial screening process. The government screens each private sector project to determine its viability and implications for the development aspirations of the country. For example, a rural agro-based enterprise, with many forward and backward linkages, is likely to receive licensing quickly. However, new foreign investment in Kenya historically has been constrained by a time-consuming and highly discretionary approval and licensing system, that is subject to corrupt practices. In response to appeals from the business community in 2007, the government earnestly began improving Kenya39s business climate. Following the reduction of required business licenses, simplification of others, and establishment of an electronic company registry, Kenya is a much better country in which to do business. In 2009, the GOK launched an e-Registry, which sped up the registration of new companies, cut regulation costs, and enhance transparency in accessing information on registered companies. The Licensing Act of 2007 has eliminated or simplified 694 licenses to date. In 2008, the government reduced the number of licenses to set up a business from 300 to 16 and is reviewing another 337 licenses. The World Bank-International Finance Corporationlsquos quotDoing Business 2010 Report, quot which ranked 183 national economies on their ease of doing business, ranks Kenya as the 98th in ease of doing business, a drop from 94th in 2009. Issues hurting Kenya39s ranking include difficulties in starting a business, registering property, paying taxes, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts. The World Bank and IFC contend that the government must significantly reduce the cost of doing business, deal with delays at the Port of Mombasa, and eliminate the requirement of even more licenses to maintain Kenya39s current level of economic growth. The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies, and Price Control Act of 1989 (with subsequent amendments) govern Kenya39s competition framework. The Act is relatively modern and works well in avoiding anti-competitive practices since the abolition of price controls in 1994. The Monopolies and Prices Commission, however, is under the Ministry of Finance, instead of an independent regulatory body. Although the Commission is independent in its investigation of competition-related issues, it must rely on ministerial powers to enforce orders on companies found to have breached competition rules. The Commission lacks the capacity to implement the legislation fully. Practices that seek to block entry into production and that discriminate against buyers (for production, resale, or final consumption) are illegal. Mergers and acquisitions must receive the green light from the Commission and the Minister of Finance in all cases, regardless of the sector, size, or market share of the companies involved. This puts an unnecessary burden on investors and the Commission. However, the Commission has no jurisdiction over the electricity, telecommunication, or insurance sectors. Under the law, manufacturers may not distribute their own products, and they are required to supply information to the government about their distributors. Antitrust legislation governs incoming foreign investment through acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers by antitrust legislation that prohibits restrictive and predatory practices, which prevent the establishment of competitive markets. Antitrust legislation also seeks to reduce the concentration of economic power by controlling monopolies, mergers, and takeovers of enterprises. Mergers and takeovers are subject to the Companies Act, the Insurance Act (in case of insurance firms), or the Banking Act (in case of financial institutions). Kenya has been ranked among the most accessible and connected markets in Africa. The country stands among the continentlsquos top five behind South Africa, Tunisia, Guinea, Sudan, and Mauritania with regard to reliability of the supply chain according to a 2007 World Bank survey on trade logistics. Kenya ranked 76 out of the 150 countries tested for efficiency in key supply chain areas such as customs procedures, cost of logistics, and infrastructure quality. Through the Port of Mombasa, Kenya is a major hub for international and regional trade for neighboring land - locked countries such as Uganda and the Great Lakes region. The survey, however, found that the cost of importing or exporting containers in Kenya and other large economies in Africa remains higher compared to the global average. Efficient Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment Kenya has a small capital market overseen by the government-controlled Capital Market Authority (CMA). The market consists of the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), 21 investment advisory firms, 20 investment banks, 6 stockbrokers, 18 fund managers, 15 authorized depositories, 13 collective investment schemes, 7 employee share ownership plans, one credit rating agency, one venture capital fund, and one central depository. The CMA regulates and supervises all these institutions and oversees the development of Kenyalsquos capital market. The CMA is working with other East African Community (EAC) member states through the Capital Market Development Committee (CMDC) and East African Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA) on a two-year roadmap to integration of their respective capital markets. Beginning in 2005, the NSE started settling all equity trades through an electronic Central Depository System (CDS). The combined use of both CDS and Automated Trading System (ATM) has moved the Kenyan capital market to globally acceptable standards. Kenya has recently joined the International Organization of Securities Commissions (whose members represent 90 percent of the world39s capital markets) as a full (ordinary) member, which solidifies their status as the primary capital market place in East Africa. The NSE enjoyed a bull market from January 4, 2005 when its blue chip share index was 2980.48 to January 10, 2007, when it reached an all-time high of 6085.50. Blue chips remained well above 5000 throughout 2007 and eventually the NSE attained a market capitalization of 16.3 billion. However, trading and prices nosedived in the wake of the January-February 2008 post-election crisis, and continued to do so as the world economy entered a recession in late summer 2008. By the end of 2008, the NSE had a market capitalization of approximately 11.4 billion (roughly on par with the end of 2007) but its blue chips had dived to 3521 (a 35 percent drop from 2007). At the end of 2009, NSE market capitalization stood at 11.1 billion and the NSE blue chips had dropped almost 8 percent from 2008 to stand at 3247. Wrapping up 2010, NSE market capitalization boomed to sit at 14.6 billion and the NSE blue chips had increased to 4433. The NSE categorizes itself into three segments: the Main Investments Market (MIMS) (with 47 offerings), the Alternative Investments Market (AIMS) (with eight offerings), and the Fixed Income Securities Market (FISMS) (with 12 offerings). The MIMS targets mature companies with strong dividend streams. The AIMS is more favorable to small and medium-sized companies, and allows firms to access lower interest rate, longer-term sources of capital through the capital markets. The FISMS allows businesses, financial institutions, and governmental and supranational authorities to raise capital through the issuance of debt securities. Fees charged by the CMA on NSE participants are a significant entry barrier for new companies. The NSE needs to do additional work to develop small business entry into the stock market. While the equity market has participated in active trading for some time, the corporate bonds market has been active only since 1997. The equity market is far larger and more mature than the bond market, which is growing. Currently, 16 corporate bonds are trading on the NSE. In general, the treasury bonds issued by the government are more active than corporate bonds although, that is beginning to change due to large corporate bond issues in 2009. Trading in commercial paper and corporate bonds issued by private companies has diversified activity at the NSE. The government regulates such trading through a set of guidelines developed in collaboration with private sector. They allow private companies to raise funds from the public without NSE quotation. Establishing the CDS encouraged the development of a secondary market for the governmentlsquos one-year floating rate bond. The CDS opened a shop window for small investors offering products in multiples of KSh 50,000 (about 769) up to KSh 1 million (about 15,400). Expenses related to credit rating services by listed companies and other issuers of corporate debt securities are tax deductible. Foreign investments through mergers and acquisitions are not restricted via cross-shareholding and stable shareholder arrangements. Hostile takeover attempts are uncommon. Private firms are free to adopt articles of incorporation, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Foreign investors can acquire shares freely in the stock market, subject to a reserve ratio of 40 percent for domestic investors in each listed company. To encourage the transfer of technology and skills, the government allows foreign investors to acquire up to 49 percent of local stockbrokerage firms and up to 70 percent of local fund management companies. Foreign ownership of equity in insurance and telecommunications companies is restricted to 66.7 percent and 80 percent, respectively. Foreign equity in companies engaged in fishing activities is restricted to 49 percent of the voting shares under the Fisheries Act. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market however, the number of credit instruments is relatively small. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The corporate tax for newly listed companies is 25 percent for a period of five years from the date of listing. The withholding tax on dividends is 7.5 percent for foreign investors and 5 percent for local investors. Foreign investors can acquire shares in a listed company subject to a minimum reserved ratio of 40 percent of the share capital of the listed company for domestic investors, with the remaining 60 percent considered as a free float available to local, foreign, and regional investors without restrictions on the level of holding. Dividends distributed to residents and non-residents are subject to a final withholding tax at the rate of 5 percent. Dividends received by financial institutions as trading income are not subject to tax. In 2007, the GOK granted the following fiscal incentives to encourage growth of capital markets: (1) exemption from income tax on interest income accruing from cash flows of securitized assets and (2) exemption from income tax on interest income accruing from all listed bonds with at least a maturity period of three years. The fiscal incentive targets providers of infrastructure services such as roads, water, power, telecommunication, schools, and hospitals. Company capital expenditures on legal costs and other incidental expenses associated with listing by introduction at the NSE are tax deductible. As of the end of 2010, Kenyalsquos banking sector consisted of 43 commercial banks, one mortgage finance company, two microfinance institution, one credit reference bureau, and 126 forex bureaus (primarily located in Nairobi and Mombasa). At the end of October 2010, total banking assets increased to almost 21 billion. Loans and advances accounted for 51 percent of total assets with 26 percent in government securities and 7 percent in placements with the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The ratios of total and core capital to total risk-weighted assets improved from 19.9 percent and 17.5 percent to 20.7 percent and 18.5 percent, respectively, mainly due to a more than proportionate increase in core and total capital. The asset quality of Kenyan banks improved from 3 percent in June 2010 to 2.4 percent in October 2010 of assets classified as non-performing. A cumbersome court system complicates the realization of collateral, which makes it difficult for creditors to accept collateral. Only 19 percent of Kenyans have formal access to financial services through commercial banks and the Post Bank. With the advent of mobile money and its recent association with the formal banking system, the number of Kenyans with access to electronic financial services continues to grow. Since most Kenyan adults own a cell phone, they can utilize mobile money services to receive their salary, do their shopping, pay their school fees, and, now, access savings, insurance, and other financial services. Kenya has four mobile money services: MPesa, the dominant service through Safaricom Zap, run by Bharti Airtel Orange Money, run by Orange and Yu Cash, run by Essar Telecom. The financial sector, in particular the commercial banks, remains relatively robust, aided by a stable macroeconomic environment and stringent supervisory oversight. Despite the global economic downturn, the banking sector expanded by 11 percent in 2009-2010, at least partially due to a continued housing boom in Nairobi. Islamic banking, which started modestly, has continued to take off as the primary Islamic-based banks expand their reach across Kenya into areas with relatively smaller Muslim minorities. Islamic banking solutions, first introduced in December 2005, took the form of deposit products tailored in line with Shariah principles, which have grown to include insurance products. The Parliament amended the Banking Act of 2004 to delegate the power to register and deregister commercial banks and financial institutions from the Finance Minister to the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). Under the Central Bank of Kenya Act, the security of tenure for the Governor is enhanced, the Bank39s operational autonomy is increased, the CBK39s bank supervision functions are strengthened, and statutory restrictions on government borrowing from the Bank are codified. The CBK sets requirements for all banking institutions and building societies to disclose their un-audited financial results on a quarterly basis by publishing them in the print media. Parliament also amended the Central Bank of Kenya Act in December 2004 to establish an independent Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) whose mandate is to advise the Bank with respect to monetary policy. The amended Act provides for the CBK to publish the lowest interest rate it charges on loans to banks referred to as the central bank rate. Other amendments transferred powers to revoke and issue licenses to financial institutions from the Ministry of Finance to the CBK and introduced an quotIn Duplum Rule, quot which limits fees and fines on non-performing loans to the amount of the outstanding principal. However, the rule is yet to be implemented. A proposal by the Finance Minister in June 2007 to increase minimum capital requirement for a commercial bank from KSh 250 million (about 3.85 million) to KSh 1 billion (about 15.4 million) over a period of three years was rejected by Parliament. The last five years have seen improvements in the financial sectorlsquos legal and regulatory framework, triggered by the enactment of the Cooperative Societies Amendment Act of 2004. To regulate Kenyalsquos burgeoning insurance industry, Parliament passed the Insurance Amendment Act 2006, which resulted in the establishment of the Insurance Regulatory Authority. To strengthen the Sacco industry, Parliament passed the 2007 Sacco Act. As a result, access to financial services has improved especially for those previously unable to bank. For instance, the introduction of M-Pesa by Safaricom has made it easy to send money via cellular phone at very low cost. All of the telecom operators followed suit with their own products in the market. Mobile money has grown in size and popularity and now provides savings and insurance services to the large majority of Kenyans who do not have access to a bank. Parliament passed and the President signed the Anti-Money Laundering Bill of 2008. This long-awaited bill provides for the creation of an FIU (financial intelligence unit) with investigatory powers and sets specific reporting requirements for financial institutions. The law came into force in June 2010, although implementing mechanisms are yet to be put into place. The Microfinance Act of 2006 became operational in 2008. The Act provides for the licensing, regulation, and supervision of the microfinance sector, necessitated by a series of mismanagement and embezzling scandals at micro-finance institutions. The law provides for the regulation of deposit taking microfinance institutions in Kenya and gives the CBK powers to oversee microfinance institutions. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to majority of Kenyans who remain unbanked. Kenya39s financial sector has a wide range of products, institutions, and markets, but there are gaps in development finance. Commercial banks, which traditionally refrained from offering long-term capital, are beginning to provide long-term capital, at least to large companies. Kenya39s corporate bond market is still in an early stage of development. While having attracted a handful of firms, it is faced with the problem of low liquidity thus, to boost long-term investment growth, deliberate efforts must be made to adequately develop vehicles for mobilizing long-term capital in Kenya. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are viable options given the prevailing market condition. However, in Kenya, DFIs have faced several constraints that have made them unable to fill in the development-financing gap. Competition from State Owned Enterprises Kenya has a long history of government ownership in industry dating back to independence. Public ownership of enterprise expanded from independence in 1963 through the 198039s. However, several commissions, one in 1979 and one in 1982, established the need for Kenya to begin divesting itself of its publicly owned enterprises. The commissions identified 240 publicly owned firms and listed 207 as non-strategic and the remaining 33 as strategic. During the first round of privatization, from 1992 to 2002, Kenya fully or partially privatized most of the non-strategic publicly owned firms. From 2003 to 2007, the government of Kenya engaged in a second round, which fully or partially privatized a number of large strategic firms, including KenGen (the primary electricity generator), Kenya Railways, Mumias Sugar, Kenya Reinsurance, Telkom Kenya, and Safaricom. These transactions netted over a 1 billion towards supporting additional development and infrastructure. The third round of privatization is scheduled to last through 2013 and includes the Development, Consolidated and National Banks of Kenya, five sugar companies, the Kenya Wine Agencies, nine hotels, portions of the Kenya Ports Authority, the Agrochemical Food Company, the remainder of KenGen, East African Portland Cement, the Kenyan Meat Commission, the New Kenya Cooperative Creameries, the Numerical Machining Complex, and several power stations. The Kenyan government seems determined to remove itself from competing with private enterprise, other than a few strategic areas. The government divested the telecom sector from 2002 to 2007, which now enjoys full competition. The sugar industry has been partially privatized and will be fully privatized with the next round of divestitures. The energy industry remains the most publicly owned sector in Kenya. The Kenyan government owns the National Oil Corporation, the Kenya Pipeline Corporation, and the oil refinery in Mombasa. Therefore, competition is either restricted or limited. KenGen, Kenya Power and Lighting, and the newly formed Geothermal Development Corporation dominate the electricity generation portion of the energy sector, which is another restricted portion of the Kenyan economy. The primary port in Mombasa is mostly government owned but privatization efforts are underway. Beyond these sectors, competition is expected and encouraged among private enterprise in Kenya. Corporate Social Responsibility Kenya has only recently applied the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The United Nations has instigated discussions under the auspices of the UN Global Compact in Kenya for the introduction of the UN Global CompactUNDP quotGrowing Sustainable Business for Poverty Reduction Initiative. quot In Kenya, surveys suggest that the highest proportion of corporate donations goes for health and medical provision. In addition, corporations direct funds towards education and training, HIVAIDS, agriculture and food security, and underprivileged children. The rationale for these philanthropic activities is closely tied to a sense that companies should give something back to the nation and to the communities in which they operate. In Kenya, many companies in the export-processing sector are seeking to mainstream HIVAIDS programs into their activities as well as other workplace issues. Local campaigns have focused attention on labor rights and abuses in Kenyan export sectors such as textiles, cut flowers, and horticulture. Some companies are taking a positive lead on labor standards, i. e. Cirio Delmonte is now accredited to the SA8000 standard. The bulk of the business community is challenged to create quality jobs by paying living wages and observing fundamental labor rights. Given that employment creation is one of the most pressing concerns in Kenya, workplace issues ndash particularly trade-offs between the creation of jobs and reasonable pay and working conditions ndash are likely to remain at the heart of the CSR agenda. In Kenya, there are relatively few incentives for businesses to adopt responsible or pro-development practices. Few consumers in either country are sufficiently informed or able to pay a premium for responsibly produced goods. While some companies producing for export markets are subject to labor or environmental requirements imposed by overseas buyers, those producers selling into the domestic market are unlikely to be subject to such pressures. Even pressures within export markets are patchy, depending on the sector, product, and buyer. A similar gap is observed between large companies operating in the formal sector, and smaller companies or micro-enterprises, which operate below the radar. Given the economic context in which financial margins are generally very thin, companies are unlikely to adopt higher standards voluntarily unless there is a clear business case. The disputed December 27, 2007 presidential election unleashed Kenyalsquos worst episode of ethnically-charged political violence. Before the antagonists reached a power-sharing agreement in late February 2008, the violence took the lives of 1,200 Kenyans and displaced 500,000, including thousands of farmers. Property damage was in the millions of dollars. Agriculture alone suffered 300 million in damages. Tourism took a major hit. Arrivals and earnings fell 90 percent in the first quarter 2008, and were off 30 percent throughout the year. At least 20,000 Kenyans employed in the tourism sector lost their jobs. The violence dissuaded both tourists and potential investors from coming to Kenya. Buyers stopped considering Kenya, resulting in several factories closing. An official government investigation, the Waki Commission, reportedly names several prominent Kenyan politicians as having instigated much of the violence. As of mid-December 2010, the commission39s report has yet to be released to the public, although on December 15, 2010 the International Criminal Court (ICC) released the names of six individuals, five government officials, and one journalist, identified as suspects in the incidents of political violence. Indictments may follow in early 2011, although a movement is afoot to withdraw from the ICC and establish a local tribunal, which is unlikely to result in any indictments unless there is a massive public outcry. Despite the global recession, the Kenyan economy began to bounce back in 2009 and 2010, especially with respect to tourism. The very slow implementation of the reform agenda, agreed upon by both parties involved in the power sharing agreement, concerns many in Kenya, who fear that without the reforms, violence will return in the 2012 election. The reform agenda includes police, land tenure, judicial, and constitutional reform as well as prosecution of those who instigated the 2007 violence. Of the various required reforms, Kenya has only partially implemented a new constitution voted for by 23 of the Kenyan people. Terrorism also remains a serious problem. Kenya suffered major terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002. On August 7, 1998, bombs exploded at the U. S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 250 and wounding more than 5,000 people. A suicide bomber killed 15 people in an Israeli-owned Mombasa hotel in November 2002. The U. S. maintains a travel warning for Kenya due to the threat of terrorism and violent crime. The shaky situation in neighboring Somalia has heightened security concerns at a time when Kenya has yet to enact appropriate anti-terrorism legislation. In 2010, several incidents occurred, including a suicide bombing of a bus in Nairobi in late December that killed two and injured more than twenty. Crime is a major source of insecurity in the country. According to a World Bank study, in 2004 almost 70 percent of investors reported major or very severe concerns about crime, theft, and disorder in Kenya, as opposed to 25 percent in Tanzania and 27 percent in Uganda. Kenya has good relationships with all its immediate neighbors. However, unstable, porous, and conflicted borders remain a source of insecurity in the region. The 2002 terrorist attacks in Mombasa are thought to have been planned in Somalia and much of the small arms used to commit crimes in Kenya are widely believed to originate from Somalia. In 2004, 11 East African countries decided to create an Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The EASBRIG is one of the five formations of the African Standby Force, established by the African Union in 2002, to carry out peacekeeping operations. The headquarters of the EASBRIG is in Addis Ababa and its secretariat in Nairobi. EASBRIG is operational and should be ready for deployment by 2015. The current coalition government inherited a problem of grand-scale economic and political corruption. In 2003, the Kibaki government enacted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Public Officers Ethics Act, setting rules for transparency and accountability, and defining graft and abuse of office. The Public Officers Ethics Act requires certain public officials to declare their wealth and that of their spouses within 90 days from August 2, 2003. Subsequently, the government fired 23 judges for corruption. Nevertheless, opposition leaders castigated the Kibaki government for its lackluster pursuit of individuals suspected of corruption. In 2004, the government established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), moved forward with the implementation of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, and launched full implementation of the Code of Ethics Act for Public Servants in 2004. A Public Procurement and Disposal Bill became law in 2005. It establishes a procurement commission to oversee all procurement matters but has proven ineffective in limiting abuse by public officials. Large public procurement programs and military procurement have been at the center of a number of corruption scandals in recent years. Enacted in 2007, the Supplies Practitioners Management Act is to regulate the training, certification, and conduct of procurement officers. The law complements the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, which came into force in January 2007. The new law, which is an effort to curb loss of public funds, stipulates strict operational measures and penalties for breach in an attempt to eradicate corruption that remains embedded in the GOKlsquos tendering processes. The KACC launched several investigations in 2006-2007 against senior government officials, including two government ministers however, none of the cases has been prosecuted successfully, in large part due to bottlenecks in the Attorney General39s Office and loopholes in the judiciary. Former Finance Minister Amos Kimunya stepped aside in early July 2008 in connection with the non-tendered sale of a government-owned property, the Grand Regency Hotel, to a Libyan group. An investigatory commission, the Cockar Commission, reportedly exonerated Kimunya of any wrongdoing. He was appointed as Minister of Trade in January 2009, providing an example of the culture of impunity in Kenya. At the end of 2010, he became Minister of Transportation. In 2009, President Kibaki irregularly reappointed the director of KACC, the primary corruption investigatory unit. With the former director of KACC and the Attorney General, no minister-level official has ever been prosecuted in Kenya despite huge corruption scandals including Goldenberg, Anglo Leasing, Triton, and the maize scandal. After a storm of protest from Parliament, the director of KACC lost his re-appointment vote. This historic vote was the first time that Parliament had overruled the President. In 2010, the KACC Board selected PLO Lumumba as director of KACC. Lumumba has taken a strong stance against corruption, and is re-opening some of the older cases, including Anglo-Leasing. In December 2010, Lumumba, in his first major corruption case, and the KACC arrested and charged Minister of Trade Henry Kosgey with abuse of office over the illegal importation of automobiles. The 2010 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked Kenya 26 out of 53 countries on the quality of governance, a drop of four places from 2009. The 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kenya 154 of 178 countries, a drop of 8 places from 146 in 2009, and its composite score of 2.1 was the second worst in the EAC, better only than Burundi. Bilateral Investment Agreements Kenya does not have a bilateral investment trade agreement with the United States, although there are hopes for talks leading to such an eventual agreement. Kenya has bilateral trade and investment agreements with Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, and the United Kingdom. Agreements are pending with Italy and Russia. Kenya and her EAC partners signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States in July 2008 as a bloc. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs Kenya is eligible for Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs. In 2008, the U. S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) supported two projects in Kenya totaling 11.78 million. The beneficiaries include two microfinance companies. In 2009, OPIC supported three projects totaling 7.4 million, including two large microfinance projects women. Historically, OPIC has committed 75 million to 42 projects in Kenya. Kenya39s population reached an estimated 40 million in July 2010. Of the approximately 20 million working Kenyans ages 15-64, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics reports that 7 million are engaged in pastoral and small-scale subsistence livestock rearing and farming. Another 8.3 million are engaged in commercial agriculture, ranching, and the informal sector. Only 2 million Kenyans are in the formal sector. Approximately 54 percent of the population lives on less than 1 per day (the 8 percent increase over the 2007 figure of 46 percent is attributable to the January-February 2008 post-election violence). Per capita income, per the Atlas method, is 770. High population growth rate of 2.64 percent per annum means there is an on-going demand for new jobs . Kenya has an abundant supply of well-educated and skilled labor in most sectors at internationally competitive rates. Though there is an apparent modest decline in new infections, high HIVAIDS prevalence continues to pose a serious threat to human resource development and an economic drain on families and the health care sector. The Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey 2007 (released in July 2008) indicates that 7.4 percent of Kenyans ages 15-64 are infected with HIV, with considerable disparities in prevalence among provinces. Kenya39s laws generally provide safeguards for worker rights and mechanisms to address complaints of their violation, but the Ministry of Labor and Human Resource Development lacks the resources to enforce them effectively. In October 2007, Parliament passed and President Kibaki signed five labor reform laws that were drafted with the ILOlsquos assistance under the U. S. Department of Laborlsquos Strengthening Labor Relations in East Africa (SLAREA) project to make Kenyalsquos labor laws more consistent with ILO core labor standards, AGOA compliant, and harmonious with Ugandalsquos and Tanzanialsquos. The new laws are: the Employment Act, which defines the fundamental rights of employees and regulates employment of children the Labor Relations Act on worker rights, the establishment of unions, and employers associations the Labor Institutions Act concerning labor courts and the Ministry of Labor and Human Resource Development the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Work Injury Benefits Act on compensation for work-related injuries and diseases. The GOK gazetted the amended texts of the new laws in 2008. Also in 2008, the Government of Kenya gazetted the National Labor Board to steer stakeholders to meet and propose necessary amendments to Parliament for smooth implementation of the Acts. The Board will set structures and rules as required by the Act. Under the new Labor Relations Act, a minimum of seven workers may apply to register a union, but the nascent union must have a minimum of 50 members to be registered. A union must show a signed membership request from 50 percent of the workers in a workplace to force an employer to recognize the union. There are 42 registered unions representing over 500,000 workers, approximately one quarter of the country39s formal sector work force. All but six, including the 240,000 member Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT), the University39s Academic Staff Union (UASU), and the Union of Kenyan Civil Servants (UKCS), are affiliated with the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), which has about 260,000 members. Union membership is voluntary and organized by craft rather than industry. The law permits strikes, but unions must notify the government 21-28 days before calling a strike. During this period, the Minister of Labor and Human Resource Development may mediate the dispute, nominate an arbitrator, or refer the matter to the Industrial Court. If the Minister of Labor and Human Resource Development refer to mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration, any subsequent strike is illegal. Kenya39s Industrial Court is backlogged and has difficulty enforcing its rulings because employers tend to appeal to the High Court. The Labor Institutions Act of 2007 expands the Industrial Court and gives it the same powers as a High Court to enforce its rulings with fines or prison sentence. The court has penalized employers for discriminating against employees because of their union activities, usually by requiring the payment of lost wages. Court-ordered reinstatement is not a common remedy because of the difficulty in implementation. Kenya has relatively harmonious labor relations. The number of strikes dropped significantly from 24 in 2007 to 8 in 2008, reflecting a 66 percent decrease. In 2008, 4718 workers were involved in the strikes representing 135,185 person-hours compared to 36,095 workers involved with strikes in 2007. The Industrial Court adjudicated 226 cases out of which it gave 192 rulings compared to 295 cases and 147 rulings in 2007. The agricultural sector had the highest reduction of strikes with two in 2008 compared to 14 in 2007. Labor law mandates the total hours worked in any two-week period should not exceed 120 hours (144 hours for night workers). Negotiations between unions and management establish wages and conditions of employment. There are twelve separate minimum wage scales, varying by location, age, and skill level. The lowest minimum wage is currently about 41 (KSh 3270) per month in urban areas and about 38 (KSh 3043) in rural areas. On May 1, 2009, the GOK the increased the statutory minimum wage by 20 percent under the General Wage Order and 18 percent for workers in the agricultural sector. To give more weight on productivity improvement in determining wage increases, the government announced, in its June 2005 budget speech, that minimum wages should be considered for adjustment after at least two years as opposed to every year, and that wages be adjusted in line with productivity changes however, the decision remains unimplemented. Workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement generally receive a better wage and benefit package than those not covered (on average 182, or KSh 14621, per month), plus a housing and transport allowance, which may account for 20 to 40 percent of a Kenyan workerlsquos compensation package. Kenyan law establishes detailed environmental, health and safety standards, but these tend not to be strictly enforced. The Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services (DOHSS), a department under the Ministry of Labor and Human Resource Development, has the mandate to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act and its subsidiary rules. DOHSS has the authority to inspect factories and work sites, except in the EPZs, but had only 45 inspectors, instead of the 168 expected to cover the entire country. DOHSS developed a program to help factories establish Health and Safety Committees and train them to conduct safety audits and submit compliance reports to DOHSS. The Directorate maintains a register of approved and certified safety and health advisers whom employers may enlist to conduct safety audits in the factories and other places of work. The Directorate should carry out these audits at least once a year and forward a copy of the audit report to the DOHSS within 30 days. However, according to the government, fewer than half of the largest factories had instituted Health and Safety Committees. Work permits are required for all foreign nationals who wish to work in Kenya. An applicant for an entry permit describes the work one intends to engage in and only can engage in that specific activity. Although there is no official time limit, a visitor39s pass or a visa is usually valid for three months and the Immigration Department must grant applicable extensions upon proper application. Applicants may apply for work permits for in any major city in Kenya, but all applications go to Nairobi for processing. Foreign investors are required to sign an agreement with the government describing training arrangements for phasing out expatriates. High unemployment levels have led the government to make it increasingly difficult for expatriates to renew or obtain work permits, and Immigration increased the price of a work permit to up to Ksh200, 000 (about 2,500). The Immigration Department occasionally has cancelled work permits before the expiry date without giving reasons. According to the law, the immigration officer issuing entry permits may require a bond of not less than KSh 100,000 (about 1,250) for each permit to be deposited with the Immigration Department. Foreign-Trade ZonesFree Ports As of December 2010, 41 Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are operating around the country. The GOK gazetted three new zones in 2009. 83 companies are operating in the zones. A government parastatal, the Kenya Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), regulates the zones. Of the 41 zones, the public sector develops and manages two. The private sector, in the form of licensed EPZ developersoperators, owns and manages the rest. Of the 83 enterprises operating in EPZs, foreign investors own 57 percent and Kenyans own 19 percent with the remainder being joint ventures. The largest privately-owned EPZ is the Sameer Industrial Park located in Nairobilsquos Industrial area. It has been operational since 1990. The Athi River EPZ, near Nairobi, is the largest publicly owned EPZ at 339 hectares. The second publicly owned EPZ is being developed in Mombasa, Kenya39s main seaport. The United States remained the principal market in 2007 for Kenyan EPZ exports. Over 55 percent of EPZ manufactured products enter the United States under AGOA provisions. The value of non-agriculture AGOA exports was 207.9 million in 2009 a drop of almost 19 percent from 2008. AGOA exports of garment products worth 244.8 million constituted 94 percent of AGOA-related exports. While the U. S. is the leading market for Kenyan EPZ exports, diversification is occurring including Europe, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Panama, and Zimbabwe. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Through the 8039s and 9039s, the deterioration in economic performance, together with rising problems of poor infrastructure, corruption, high cost of borrowing, crime and insecurity, and lack of investor confidence in reforms generated a long period of low foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. Per the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows in the period 1990-2000 averaged 29 million a year. This report reflects 2009 FDI inflows of 141 million, an increase of 47 percent over a dismal 2008. The report indicates 2009 total FDI stock in Kenya of 2.13 billion. These figures compare poorly to Tanzania, which shows FDI inflows of 645 million and total FDI stock of 5.34 billion in 2009. The market value of U. S. investment stands at approximately 183 million (2008 estimate), primarily concentrated in commerce, light manufacturing, and tourism industry. Most foreign investment in manufacturing since 2001 has been in the EPZs 64 percent tied to AGOA-related apparel investment. Poor data collection in Kenya leads to underestimating actual inflows of FDI. There is no clear mandate by any agency to collect data on FDI. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), the Kenya Investment Authority (KIA), and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) all collect only partial information on either balance of payments inflows or investment projects. The government does not publish data on the value of foreign direct investment (positionstock and annual investment capital flows) by country of origin or by industry sector destination. Neither is data available on Kenyalsquos investment abroad. However, recent media reports indicate a drop in FDI, now superseded by domestic investment ndash a clear indication that Kenya must implement constitutional and political reforms to attract FDI, attain double-digit economic growth, and achieve its goals of becoming a middle-income country by 2030. . - , , . . ,. ,,. . , - . ,,. ,. , , - instavector. ru. . QUIK. . . . , - , . - , , , . , , . ,. raquo
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